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D uring the last two decades, there has been a growing interest con-cerning military expenditures in developing countries. Several 
research areas have included 
•Examining whether military spending helps or hinders economic 
growth; 
•Comparing economic performance under different regime 
types; 
•Noting what factors cause developing countries to become either 
producers or nonproducers; and 
•Studying the major determinants of defense spending in Third 
World countries. 
Although the main purpose of this article is to extend the discussion 
on the determinants of military spending, the other three areas are in-
tegrated as well to test their impact on defense spending. 
Up to now, many policy analysts and researchers have assumed that 
military expenditures are determined exogenously; external factors-
such as the threat of aggression-cannot always be measured directly, 
and some form of proxy variable is often substituted. Hence the link 
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between the determinants of defense spending on the one hand and the 
level of military expenditures in developing countries on the other has 
not been subject to economic analysis. 
Following up recent work by Harris and Maizels and Nissanke,1 
this paper hypothesizes that military expenditures can often be deter-
mined by economic (internal) factors. This hypothesis is tested on a case-
by-case approach using time-series data from 10 Latin American coun-
tries (Argentina, Peru, Mexico, Venezuela, Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay, 
Colombia, Brazil, and Ecuador). 
Review of the Literature 
One of the earliest attempts to quantify the relationship between 
military spending and economic growth was completed by Emile Benoit,2 
who tentatively found that defense spending and economic performance 
were positively correlated. No clear agreement, however, has yet 
emerged: some authors suggest a positive role of defense budgets under 
certain conditions3 and others point to an overall negative effect.4 This 
topic has also begun to receive some attention in the literature.5 Chan 
has recently summarized the major research efforts and remaining 
problems in this area.6 For example, he noted little effort on the direc-
tion of causality-that is, does defense spending lead to growth or does 
economic growth allow nations to "indulge in" more military programs? 
Or does one factor influence the other? Chan concluded: 
We have probably reached a point of diminishing returns in 
relying on aggregate cross-national studies to inform us about 
the economic impact of defense spending. Instead, it appears 
that future research will profit more from discriminating di-
achronic studies of individual countries.7 
Another area of interest has been to compare the economic perfor-
mance under different political regimes (civilian versus military, for ex-
ample). Remmer recently summarized this research and noted: 
The empirical studies of regime type, public policy, and policy 
outcomes conducted so far, whether focused on Latin Amer-
ica or including other areas as well, tend to support the con-
clusion that regime differences have little or no impact on 
public policy.8 
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She suggested that a country's relative performance was a function of 
endogenous economic factors, not regime type.9 
Neuman's efforts to investigate why only certain developing coun-
tries produce weapons led her to conclude that there exists "a hierar-
chically shaped arms production system based largely on factors of scale." 
She suggested that "the existence of a large military to provide an ade-
quate market, combined with a generous national income and sizable 
population to support the necessary infrastructure," will be important 
in determining whether a country becomes an arms producer.10 Looney 
and Frederiksen suggested that while both population and size play an 
important role, an endogenous economic environment conducive to 
weapons production must also be present.u Their results pointed to ad-
ditional factors that play an important role in the arms production process, 
such as contact with the world economy, the amount of public debt, and 
foreign trade. 
Recent research on the determinants of military spending has spanned 
several disciplines. Hill noted that "the military spending level of any 
nation is likely to be a product of a number of separate forces," includ-
ing arms races, military alliances, status and rank discrepancies in in-
ternational systems, military aid, size and wealth of the country, the form 
of government, the extent of military involvement, internal social divi-
siveness, and internal political conflict.12 While Hill was unable to find 
a single variable to account for the large differences in defense budgets 
in developing countries, he called· attention to 
the salience of important international linkages as influences 
on military spending. To the extent that it is status in the sys-
tem and ties to the central subsystem which influence mili-
tary spending, reduction in the tension and competitiveness 
of that subsystem should have important impacts for slow-
ing military spending increases.13 
Westing, interested in the ways to reduce military outlays, examined 
1975 data for 159 nations to "find the basis on which a nation deter-
mines its level of military expenditures."14 Hypothesizing that countries 
would need to protect their land and wealth, Westing tested for the im-
pact of population, land area (total and productive), and wealth (as mea-
sured by gross national product). He found a positive correlation between 
military spending levels and population size, the extent of productive 
land area, and GNP. He concluded that military expenditures in many 
developing countries will rise concomitant with increases in wealth.15 
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Two recent studies have examined the determinants of military ex-
penditure levels in industrialized countries. Griffin, Wallace, and Devine 
examined defense spending levels in the United States from 1949 to 1976 
and concluded that "military outlays [as a percentage of GNP] do ap-
pear to be employed as a counter-cyclical fiscal instrument by the state."16 
Treddenick tested for the impact of economic variables on the recent 
pattern of Canadian military expenditures. Specifically, he wished to 
see whether expenditures in Canada might be determined by "domestic 
economic imperatives ... independent of any security considerations."17 
He determined that "recent large increases in Canadian defense expen-
ditures have been influenced more by economic than by security con-
siderations," 18 and that the Canadian government has used changes in 
military budgets as a policy instrument. 
In one of the earliest studies relating defense spending to economic 
variables, Ames and Goff examined defense and education expenditures 
in 16 Latin American countries for the period 1948-68.19 They attempted 
to discover 
•The relationship between changes in defense and in education 
spending; 
•The effect of prior-year defense and education spending levels; 
•Whether economic variables were significant determinants of 
spending levels; and 
•Whether political variables significantly improved their model. 
While noting it "would be premature to conclude that political factors 
are generally less important than economic factors in determining spend-
ing;' they found that their political variables were not major determinants 
of education or defense spending levels,20 that changes in education and 
defense spending were related to changes in available resources. They 
indicated that for Latin America, at least, there might not be a common 
allocative process and suggested that further research concentrate "on 
8 to 10 carefully chosen cases."21 
O'Leary and Coplin hypothesized seven factors that might bear on 
defense spending levels in Latin America: 22 the economic condition of 
the country, the role of the military in nonmilitary affairs, internal-security 
needs, arms races, military budgets in rival states, internal political sup-
port, and the age structure of existing equipment. While admitting the 
difficulty in quantifying many of these faotors, they found little correla-
tion between military spending and growth domestic product levels or 
any of the other factors except neighbors' arms purchases and budget 
levels of rival services in other countries, both of which acted as a sort 
of "reference point" in setting individual countries' budget levels. 
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In 1986 Maizels and Nissanke conducted a cross-section study of 
83 countries with average data compiled in 1978 and 1980.23 They hypothe-
sized three potential determinants of military expenditures in any coun-
try: the political framework, military activity, and economic linkages. 
However, the relative importance of each factor will be determined by 
national, regional, or global conflicts or interactions in the individual 
country. For example, at the national level, economic factors such as 
the level of development (urbanization, inequalities in wealth and in-
come, and opportunities for advancement), real-income growth, the size 
of the state budget, and the influence of the military-industrial complex 
are considered important determinants of military spending. At the global 
level, the growth of foreign exchange, the influence of foreign capital, 
and major aid donors are thought to be major determinants. 
After estimating regression equations for the entire sample and for 
three regions (Africa, Asia, and Latin America), they noted not only 
the complexity of factors, but also that those factors would vary from 
country to country. 
Domestic factors, particularly the need perceived by ruling 
elites to repress internal opposition groups, and external fac-
tors, including relations with the global power blocs and the 
availability of foreign exchange to purchase arms from abroad, 
also appear to be major determinants of government deci-
sions in regard to military expenditures.24 
In the same year, Harris noted the scant attention paid to the eco-
nomic determinants of military spending levels in developing countries.25 
In a time-series analysis to verify the findings of Ames and Goff, he 
examined the importance of endogenous economic variables on defense 
spending levels in five ASEAN (Association of South-East Nations) 
countries-Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and 
Thailand. The independent variables were GNP levels, government 
revenues, inflation rates, and the balance of payments. The dependent 
variables included defense as a percentage of both GNP and central 
government expenditures, and the level of defense spending. In addi-
tion, Harris tested for the presence of some sort of lag structure by 
regressing the dependent variables against the previous year's value of 
the independent variables. He concluded that 
domestic economic conditions, especially government cur-
rent revenue, appear to exert at least a moderate influence 
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on annual changes in defense expenditure in ASEAN .... 
A nation's GNP sets a broad limit on its domestically financed 
defense expenditure, and that defense expenditure in the previ-
ous year is a good indicator of its level in the next year.26 
Harris also noted that the balance of payments was an indirect ef-
fect through government revenues and that cutting defense expenditures 
might be relatively difficult given their high personnel component. 
As noted, this paper attempts to extend the discussion of the im-
pact that economic variables have on defense spending levels by means 
of individual studies over time (rather than by cross section) for 10 Latin 
American countries. Several reasons exist for the choice of these par-
ticular countries. First, we would like to replicate O'Leary and Coplin's 
findings that GDP and military spending levels are not correlated in Latin 
America. Second, this paper will verify the results obtained by Harris 
for the 5 ASEAN countries for another region of the world. In this 
context, the 10 countries that comprise this study appear to belong to 
a homogeneous group-limited conflicts and external threats. In addi-
tion, they account for more than 93 percent of the total GNP (9 of them 
have the largest GNP) and approximately 91 percent of total military 
expenditures in 1982 for Central and South America (excluding Cuba).27 
This study will also confirm the finding of Ames and Goff that "Latin 
America may not have a common allocative process; instead, different 
models may explain different groups of countries or time periods."28 
While a positive correlation exists between economic variables and mili-
tary spending levels, the relevant economic variable is likely to differ 
from one country to the next. Unfortunately, there is little that can be 
done a priori to predict which economic variable is relevant for each 
country. 
The Model and Expected Results 
Four different models are estimated for each country. Each model 
represents the possible linkage between the effect and timing of eco-
nomic variables and the effect of previous military budgets on current 
defense budgets. The dependent variable is the level of military expen-
ditures (ME).29 Following previous studi6s cited above, GDP was in-
cluded as an independent variable to represent a general resource con-
straint faced by each country. With respect to specific constraints, a 
government financing variable was also included in the model. This vari-
able tests for any fiscal impact on the level of military expenditures. 
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Two variables were examined. On the one hand, government ex-
penditures (GE) were tested for the presence of Wagner's law: military 
budgets will increase in pace with general governmental expenditure lev-
els. Alternatively, as suggested by Harris, military outlays might only 
rise with increases in the overall funding ability of the government, mea-
sured here by government revenues. Finally a lagged value of military 
expenditures (MEL) was incorporated to test for a "distributed lag ef-
fect."30 In the case of Argentina, a dummy variable was included to ac-
count for the Falklands crisis. The dummy variable took the value of 0 
for the period 1971-81 and a value of 1 for 1982 and 1983. 
The four alternative models are 
I ME = f (GDP, GE) 
III ME = f (GDP, MEL, GE) 
Model I describes a situation in which military budgets simply de-
pend on the current GDP and the government's current fiscal position. 
Model II, which hypothesizes that military spending depends on last 
year's GDP and fiscal position (GDPL and MEJ, describes cases where 
a government-for whatever reason-reacts more slowly in altering 
defense budgets in response to changes in constraints. Model III mir-
rors model I except that the impact of changes in the government's fis-
cal position affect military budgets over time; that is, a country might 
commit itself to multiyear military programs. Model IV is similar to 
model II but also incorporates MEL (as just described). 
Some of the existing literature suggests a priori which of the four 
models is appropriate for each country. First, as suggested, countries 
relatively resource constrained might postpone military expenditures even 
during periods of rising government expenditures or revenues.32 This 
suggests that either model II or IV describes the likely linkage between 
fiscal conditions and military budgets. Specifically, of the 10 countries 
considered, we identified P<traguay, Ecuador, Chile, Uruguay, and Peru 
as being resource constrained. 
Type of regime is the second factor that might indicate which model 
is most appropriate for each country. In a recent study for Argentina, 
we found that military regimes are more inclined to reduce social ex-
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penditures during periods of expanded budgets.33 If this is a general pattern 
in Latin America, one would expect other countries with military re-
gimes to be depicted by either model I or III. Civilian regimes, on the 
other hand, might delay military spending. 
Third, it is possible that an indigenous arms industry may affect 
the linkage. If arms producers tend to experience positive spin-offs from 
weapons production, the model appropriate for these countries might 
be I or III: military expenditures are likely to be closely linked to cur-
rent revenues and/or expenditures because of the need for continuous 
funding. 
A fourth factor might be the geopolitical role of the nation. In this 
case, it is possible that the larger or more influential countries will strive 
for a stable proportion of military expenditures as a percentage of over-
all economic capability. If this interpretation is correct, we would ex-
pect to find the larger regional powers (Brazil, Argentina, and Venezuela) 
to exhibit patterns depicted by models III or IV: military spending ad-
justments are gradual over time. 
Finally, it is possible that the major oil-exporting nations (Venezuela, 
Mexico, and Ecuador) might best be described by model III.34 Under 
this scenario, governments might attempt to modernize their military 
with oil revenues. Quite likely, a large proportion of this expenditure 
will be spread out over time for large-scale weapons acquisition. 
Empirical Results 
The results of the regression analysis (see table 1)35 reveal several 
interesting patterns and surprises in terms of the hypotheses suggested 
above. Most importantly, our results indicate the significance of fiscal 
variables in accounting for a large proportion of observed fluctuations 
in Latin American military expenditures. Levels of government expen-
ditures (or, in two cases, revenues) were significant in determining lev-
els of military expenditures in Chile, Venezuela, Brazil, Peru, Uruguay, 
and Ecuador. The more general constraint of individual nations' GDP 
was statistically significant for Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, Venezuela, and 
Argentina. These findings differ, however, to some degree with the results 
obtained by O'Leary and Coplin but agree with those of others, such 
as Harris. We support the findings of Ames and Goff, who posit that 
there is no one allocative process across the sample set. In some in-
stances, current GDP or government expenditures are important; in 
others, a lagged value gives better results. For half the countries, the 
coefficient of the lagged value of military expenditures is significant, 




Partial Regressions Results (t-statistics) 
For 10 Latin American Countries 
Country/ Model I Model II Model Ill Model IV R2 
Period GDP GE GDPL GEL GDP MEL GE GDPL MEL GEL OUM 
Ecuador 6.81 2.25 .90 
1955-82 
Chile 4.49 18.3 .98 
1973-83 
Mexico 2.51 .63b .91 
1955-82 
Peru -1.04b 7.07 .88 
1955-82 
Uruguay 1.98b 2.988 .88 
1973-83 
Brazil -1.55b 6.83 2.20 .79 
1963-83 
Venezuela 5.87 5.02 2.728 .98 
1955-82 
Paraguay .48b 4.21 .94b .81 
1973-83 
Colombia 1.52b 3.71 -.84b .54 
1955-82 
Argentina 2.11b 5.35 -.84b 10.66 .99 
1971-83 
Notes: aGovernment revenues. 
bStatistically insignificant at the 95 percent level of confidence. 
indicating that-for at least these states-the effect of changes in revenues 
or expenditures is felt in the military budget many years afterward. As 
hypothesiz.ed, the dummy variable is statistically significant for Argentina. 
Specifically, in terms of our first hypothesis-that defense and ex-
penditure linkages might be predicted by the degree of resource 
constraint-only Chile and Uruguay in the constrained group and Brazil 
and Venezuela in the other group followed a predicted pattern. With regard 
to the regime hypothesis, the results were just as inconclusive: Brazil, 
Paraguay, Colombia, and Mexico wem the only countries to fall into 
their predicted group. Of the eight arms producers in our sample, only 
three fell into the predicted group (Venezuela, Brazil, and Ecuador). 
The remaining producers-Argentina, Peru, Mexico, Colombia, and 
Chile-fell into either model II or IV. 
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The best predicted results were obtained under the geopolitical 
hypothesis. Three regional powers (Venezuela, Brazil, and Argentina) 
all followed the anticipated pattern. On the other hand, Paraguay and 
Colombia followed a pattern not forecast by our hypothesis. Finally, of 
the three oil producers, only Venezuela followed the predicted pattern. 
Summary and Conclusions 
While there are many diverse reasons for developing countries to 
spend scarce resources on military equipment, this article has focused 
solely on economic determinants. We recognize, however, that there are 
many other reasons for defense spending. 
Our results-estimated for 10 Latin American countries-indicate 
that a large proportion of variability in defense expenditures can be ex-
plained by economic variables: the overall constraint (GDP) and fiscal 
funding variables (primarily government expenditures but in two cases 
government revenues). While this information is insightful, it is of lit-
tle help when forecasting military expenditures on a country-by-country 
basis, given that the four models we proposed are a priori equally valid. 
In other words, it is very difficult to predict which of the four models 
is valid for any particular country in Latin America. On the positive 
side, however, the results suggest that the large regional powers might 
have a somewhat different set of fiscal linkages than the smaller coun-
tries. This might enable some broad generalizations about future defense 
allocations to be made for this small set of countries. 
Further, the results indicate that while cross-sectional studies may 
be useful in a general way, they cannot identify the short-run adjust-
ment dynamics likely to play a fundamental role in affecting defense 
budgets in any given year. 
This time-series analysis has confirmed in large part the findings 
of other scholars that economic variables should not be overlooked when 
trying to explain observed patterns of defense spending. Since we found 
no one model to be common to all 10 countries, our findings suggest 
that for these states-and possibly for a much larger set-the timing of 
the fiscal impact (immediate, short-, or a longer-run distributed effect) 
must also be considered. 
We conclude that for these 10 countrie.s any forecast of military ex-
penditures that excludes economic factors is likely to be substantially 
inaccurate. The evidence indicates economic factors play a significant 
role in Latin America in determining military budgets; future research 
might also find this pattern in other Third World countries as well. 
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